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Each extractor has a distinct quadratic extraction cost and faces a linear industry
demand schedule. We observe that the open loop and closed loop solutions are the
same if initial stocks are such that each competitor is extracting in every period in
which her competitors are extracting. (oligop_july06.tex)
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1 Introduction
The best hope for understanding oil extraction markets "on paper" would appear to be via
oligopoly theory.1 Here we present a new quadratic revenue, quadratic extraction cost case,
each extractor with her own distinct costs, in which open loop and closed loop competition
yields the same extraction paths. The su¢ ciency condition for the solutions to be the same
here is simply that the endowments of oil to extractors (the initial ￿nite stocks) must be
such that each competitor produces positive quantities in every period.
2 The Model
The inverted market demand schedule is a￿b[q1
t +q2
t]; a and slope b positive. An extractor￿ s
current pro￿t, given q1
t currently extracted, is ￿1(q1
t;q2





work in discrete time.2 Si




starts initially with a ￿xed endowment, Si
0: We work here in the text with two extractors for
ease of exposition. In Appendix 2 we report on cases with more than two extractors. Each
extractor has extraction cost [qi
t]2di with di > 0: Our focus is on the case of d1 6= d2:(The
case of d1 = d2 is one of the two in Eswaran and Lewis [1985].) Each agent maximizes the
1 Eswaran and Lewis [1985] presented two interesting discrete-time examples in which open loop and closed
loop competition among extracting oligopolists yielded the same paths of extraction. For one case competitors
had distinct endowments and faced a constant elasticity industry demand schedule. This has recently been
re-worked in continuous time by Benchakroun and Long [2005] and has been employed in an interesting
exercise. In the other case, each ￿rm had identical endowments and identical quadratic extraction costs and
the industry demand schedule was linear. We are then generalizing this last example by allowing for each
￿rm to have distinct quadratic extraction costs and distinct initial stocks.
2 We follow Eswaran and Lewis [1985]. The continuous time treatment of our problem might be simpler to
work out because endpoint conditions are quite restrictive. We discuss endpoint conditions below for our
discrete time formulation. Levhari and Mirman [1980] is a classic early closed loop oligopoly problem in
discrete time.
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present value of her pro￿t stream to quantity qi




0: ￿ is the
constant discount factor, 0 < ￿ < 1; the same for each extractor. We specify initial stocks




0; and these initial stocks are such
that each competitor produces positive output in the same period as another competitor is
producing.
For the open loop case, each extractor maximizes her present value of pro￿ts by choice
of a quantity stream, fqi
1;qi
2;:::;qi
T￿1g; taking the quantity stream of each competitor as
parametric. We can distinguish two cases. (1) "knife-edged" endpoints3: in this case the
initial quantities are such that in the ￿nal period, the qi
T￿1
0s are such that marginal pro￿t,
mri
t ￿ mci



































































and so on, ...




D ; b q1
T￿2 =
(1￿￿2)a[b+2d2]
D ; b q1
T￿3 =
(1￿￿3)a[b+2d2]







D ; b q2
T￿2 =
(1￿￿2)a[b+2d1]
D ; b q2
T￿3 =
(1￿￿3)a[b+2d1]




so on. This knife-edged endpoint solution is too special to merit much attention but the hat
3 The "knife-edge" terminal condition is central to continuous time dynamic optimization problems. See
Gelfand and Fomin [1963, p. 60]. Lozada [1993] discusses terminal condtitions for discrete time problems
and compares the "knife-edge" terminal condition with the "general" terminal condition. In brief, dynamic
problems end with a very restrictive condition in the "knife-edge" case and end somewhat "ragged" in
general. Our analysis focuses on the general case.
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q expressions turn out to be useful as components of the solution quantities for the general
case.
(2) "general" endpoints: initial quantities are such that in the ￿nal period, the qi
T￿1
0s























For this general case, there is not a simple backward recursion yielding the solution values
for quantities extracted and this general case is the one which we focus on here.
3 Solving the Closed Loop Problem
In the closed loop case, competition among extractors is re-opened de novo at each consecu-
tive period, contingent on each player taking current stock levels as the current state of the
system. There is no commitment at period zero to an extraction path as there is with open
loop competition. Closed loop competition requires competitive outcomes to be worked out
for each period in a backward recursion or by dynamic programming arguments.






































There are no residual stocks at the termination of extraction for any extractor. Moving one
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Assuming di⁄erentiability of the V i










































































D ; D = (2b+2d1)(2b+2d2)￿b2: This result in (3) is central because each
competitor￿ s current extraction is being represented as independent of the other competitor￿ s
current level of stock.4 It is as if each competitor were extracting from her own stock,
independently of the other extractor. The pair of equations in (2) is also fundamental
because they are a template for further backward steps in the solution.
The envelope theorem simpli￿es the "generation" of the equations for proceeding to
solve for q1
T￿3 and q2
T￿3: We end up faced with the following system to deal with. Current
4 This two ￿rm, two period result was ￿rst observed by Michael Brolley, an undergraduate research assistant
who was checking some of our detailed notes on the Eswaran-Lewis research. We were surprised to get
essentially Eswaran-Lewis results for our considerably more general speci￿cation of each ￿rm￿ s initial stock
and extraction costs.
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marginal revenue minus marginal cost for a ￿rm is the appropriately discounted marginal



























































The envelope theorem yields the "cancellation" of mr ￿ mc terms for intermediate dates.











1 + ￿ + ￿
2[ST￿3 ￿ b q
i








We observe each current extraction a function of the extractor￿ s current stock. This in-
dependence property is essential to the sameness of extraction paths under open loop and
closed loop competition.6 Moving one period toward the present, we again consider ￿rst



























































5 Details are provided in Appendix 1.
6 See Eswaren and Lewis [1985] for details on the sameness of open loop and closed loop solutions.
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1 + ￿ + ￿
2











T￿4 ￿ b q
i
T￿1 ￿ b q
i
T￿2]







(In Appendix 1 we ￿ll in the details of solving for qi
T￿4:) We observe the independence
property present when we extend the backward recursion from the future toward the present.




1 + ￿ + ￿
2 + ::: + ￿
T￿t￿2
1 + ￿ + ￿
2 + ￿







1 + ￿ + ￿
2 + ￿
3 + ::: + ￿
T￿t￿1[S
i
T￿t ￿ b q
i
T￿1 ￿ b q
i
T￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ b q
i
T￿t￿2]
for i = 1;2:8
We illustrate with a numerical example. We take extractor 1 to be high cost with d1 = 0:3
and d2 = 0:2: The inverse demand schedule is 10￿0:1fq1
t +q2
tg: The discount factor, ￿ is 0:8:
For three periods of positive extraction, we turn to our formulas above and obtain b q1
T = 0;
b q1
T￿1 = 1:0; b q1
T￿2 = 1:8; and b q1
T￿3 = 2:44; with endowment S1
T￿3 = 5:24; and b q2
T = 0;
b q2
T￿1 = 1:4; b q2
T￿2 = 2:52 and b q2
T￿3 = 3:416; with endowment S2
T￿3 = 7:336: We now consider
the closed loop problem with endowments S1
T￿3 = 5:0 and S2
T￿3 = 7:0; each slightly less than
the endowments above, namely those selected to have a special end point condition. Using
our formulas above for the qi 0s; we obtain, q1
T￿3 = 2:377; q1
T￿2 = 1:7; and q1
T￿10:913; and
q2
T￿3 = 3:326; q2
T￿2 = 2:41; and q2
T￿1 = 1:264: These values are identical with those which
solve the corresponding open loop problem (the one with commitment at the intial period
by each player).
7 There is a check on these derivations. We know the exact expessions for the b qi
T￿t: We can replace the
corresponding expressions without hats with these with hats and verify that in each case the right hand sides
for our "formulae" match the left hand sides.
8 There is a very similar set of formulas for the case of a single monopoly extractor with quadatic extraction
costs and facing a linear demand schedule.
6The Quadratic Oil Extraction Oligopoly
The ￿nal step is to substitute for the q0s in the present value pro￿t functions in a backward



















T￿3); and so on.









above. Note that ￿
i
1 = 0 and ￿i
1 = 1:) We display the coe¢ cients of our equation in cases





































































2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1







































3 ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿3)￿
1


















2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1
3 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿3)￿
1
4)




2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1






































2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1
3 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ :::
￿(1 ￿ ￿n￿1)￿
1




2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1







2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
2


































































9 These value functions satisfy the Bellman equation: V i
t (S1
t ;S2
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2￿2(1 ￿ ￿3)(1 ￿ ￿4)


















2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1
3






2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
2




















n)) + ::: + ￿













2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
2
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2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1
3













n) + ::: + ￿
n￿1￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)




2 ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)￿
1














T￿3)2 = ￿(b + d1)f(￿3)2 + ￿(￿2(1 ￿ ￿3))2 + ￿




T￿4)2 = ￿(b + d1)f(￿4)2 + ￿(￿3(1 ￿ ￿4))2 + ￿
2(￿2(1 ￿ ￿3)(1 ￿ ￿4))2
+￿





T￿n)2 = ￿(b + d1)f(￿n)2 + ￿(￿n￿1(1 ￿ ￿n))2 + ::: + ￿
n￿1(￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)

















T￿3 = ￿bf(￿3)2 + ￿(￿2(1 ￿ ￿3))2 + ￿






T￿4 = ￿bf(￿4)2 + ￿(￿3(1 ￿ ￿4))2 + ￿
2(￿2(1 ￿ ￿3)(1 ￿ ￿4))2
+￿







T￿n = ￿bf(￿n)2 + ￿(￿n￿1(1 ￿ ￿n))2 + ::: + ￿
n￿1(￿1(1 ￿ ￿2)
￿::: ￿ (1 ￿ ￿n))2gS1
T￿nS2
T￿n
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4 Concluding Remarks
Our initial scrutiny of end-point conditions for the quadratic oligopoly exhaustible resource
extraction problem led us to the surprising discovery of the well-behavedness of the closed
loop version with each extractor with distinct quadratic extraction costs and distinct initial
holdings of stock to extract. The well-behavedness extends to the closed loop and open loop
solutions being the same provided each extractor is doing positive extraction when each of
her competitors is doing positive extractions, a seemingly weak requirement. We know that
such well-behavedness is present when industry demand is speci￿ed as constant elasticity and
each ￿rm has no cost of extraction but future research will reveal if these two cases exhaust
the list of oligopoly extraction problems in which open loop and closed loop problems exhibit
identical extraction paths.
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Appendix 1: Calculations for obtaining qi
T￿4 with 2
￿rms
Pro￿t for ￿rm 1 is
￿
1



























































There is an analogous pro￿t statement for ￿rm 2; with the chief di⁄erence the presence of






























1 + ￿ + ￿
2[ST￿3 ￿ b q
i
T￿1] i = 1;2:




T￿4 = 0: Exploiting the envelope theo-
rem, we get













T￿4 ￿ b q
1











T￿4 ￿ b q
2
T￿1 ￿ b q
2
T￿2]g
and for the analogous ￿rst order condition for ￿rm 2 in













T￿4 ￿ b q
2











T￿4 ￿ b q
1
T￿1 ￿ b q
1
T￿2]g:
We solve for q1
T￿4 and q2




1 + ￿ + ￿
2











T￿4 ￿ b q
i
T￿1 ￿ b q
i
T￿2] i = 1;2:
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We emphasize that each extractor￿ s current quantity extracted is being expressed as a linear
function of her own current stock alone, even though each extractor has distinct extraction
costs. Below we provide detail for solving for the qi
T￿t
0s for the 3 ￿rm case. This detail
"works" as well for the two ￿rm case above. One can readily see the "transition" from the
backward recursion from period T ￿ t to period T ￿ t ￿ 1:
Appendix 2: More than Two Firms
Moving backward two periods, the ￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximization over the
two end periods for each of the three ￿rms are
















































T￿2 ￿ [2b + 2d
3]q
3





















6 6 6 6 6
4
[2b + 2d1] b b
b [2b + 2d2] b
b b [2b + 2d3]
3
7





















6 6 6 6 6
4




(1 ￿ ￿)a + ￿bS1
T￿2 + ￿[2b + 2d2]S2
T￿2 + ￿bS3
T￿2
(1 ￿ ￿)a + ￿bS1
T￿2 + ￿bS2




7 7 7 7 7
5
:





































































af[2b + 2d1][2b + 2d2] ￿ b[2b +
2d1]￿b[2b+2d2]+b2g; and ￿ = f[2b+2d1][2b+2d2][2b+2d3]￿b2[2b+2d1]￿b2[2b+2d2]￿
b2[2b+2d3]+2b3g: These solutions or "extraction rules" have the identical form as those for
the two ￿rm case.
What we are dealing with generically is a system of the form
2























6 6 6 6
6 6
4
A + k1S1 + bS2 + bS3
A + bS1 + k2S2 + bS3
A + bS1 + bS2 + k3S3
3




for ki 0s; b0s; A0s and Si 0s positive scalars. The presence of the A0s lead to the solution
for the b qi part of our solutions above. We are however interested in when the solution qi
depends on Si alone. This leaves us to focus our attention on the reduced system
2























6 6 6 6 6
6
4
k1S1 + bS2 + bS3
bS1 + k2S2 + bS3
bS1 + bS2 + k3S3
3




This system is fundamental to our result that qi solves in terms of Si alone. We verify that











i; i = 1;2;3:
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We now indicate how a proof by induction on the size of our system of equations estab-
lishes that each ￿rm￿ s current extraction, qi can be expressed as a function of its own current
stock Si alone. We illustrate the induction step of moving from an (n￿1)￿(n￿1) system,
for which the result is assumed true, to an n￿n system. We consider now the corresponding
4￿4 system in terms of 3￿3 subsystems (this illustrates the key step in an induction proof).
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6
4
k1 b b b
b k2 b b
b b k3 b
b b b k4
3
7 7 7




















6 6 6 6 6 6
6
4
k1S1 + bS2 + bS3 + bS4
bS1 + k2S2 + bS3 + bS4
bS1 + bS2 + k3S3 + bS4
bS1 + bS2 + bS3 + k4S4
3
7 7 7










































bS1 + k2S2 + bS3 + bS4 b b
bS1 + bS2 + k3S3 + bS4 k3 b




























k2 bS1 + k2S2 + bS3 + bS4 b
b bS1 + bS2 + k3S3 + bS4 b




























k2 b bS1 + k2S2 + bS3 + bS4
b k3 bS1 + bS2 + k3S3 + bS4

























> > > > > > <



































7 7 7 7
5
9
> > > > > > =






















6 6 6 6 6
4
k2S2 + bS3 + bS4 b b
bS2 + k3S3 + bS4 k3 b
bS2 + bS3 + k4S4 b k4
3
7 7























6 6 6 6 6
4
k2 k2S2 + bS3 + bS4 b
b bS2 + k3S3 + bS4 b
b bS2 + bS3 + k4S4 k4
3
7























6 6 6 6 6
4
k2 b k2S2 + bS3 + bS4
b k3 bS2 + k3S3 + bS4
b b bS2 + bS3 + k4S4
3
7
7 7 7 7 7
5




















> > > > > > <



































7 7 7 7
5
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
;
since the last six terms cancel each other pairwise,
for D = det
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6
4
k1 b b b
b k2 b b
b b k3 b
b b b k4
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7
7
5
; leaving the solution for q1 simply in terms of S1: ￿
The induction step is the observation that the three terms on the right hand side in the
last three pairs of terms in the penultimate large expression are each the essentials for a
solution for qi in a 3￿3 system. Hence we have established that if the result is true for a
2￿2 sytem, and for a (n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ 1) system, it is true for an n ￿ n system. (In fact we
established it true for a 2￿2 sytem, and then made use of its validity for a 3￿3 system in
establishing the result for a 4￿4 system. We simply illustrated the key step in a complete
induction proof.) We have established that for any ￿nite number of ￿rms, each ￿rm￿ s current
quantity extracted can be expressed as a function of its own current stock alone. This is the
key step in characterizing the closed loop solution. (Given our calculations it is obvious that
the open loop solution is the same.) Besides drawing on the quadratic nature of revenue and
extraction cost for each ￿rm, the key property in inferring that the open loop and closed
loop solutions are the same is that in the solutions, each ￿rm ends up extracting over the
same number of periods as each of its competitors. This requires that each ￿rm￿ s endowment
of stock must be "right" in order that our demonstration of the sameness of the open and
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closed loop solutions is valid. Hence su¢ cient conditions for the open loop and closed loop
solutions to be the same are (a) quadratic forms for revenue and extraction cost per ￿rm
and (b) "appropriate" endowments of stock for each ￿rm at the initial date.
In general, the systems to solve in terms of periods in the backward recursion for the










































































































The non-mechanical step is substituting for (Si
T￿2 ￿ qi
T￿2) each time one moves backwards
in the recursion. Crucial here is the fact that the matrix algebra is essentially the same for
each period in the sequence. Hence our induction proof sketched above holds for any date

















[2b + 2d1] b b
b [2b + 2d2] b
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6 6 6 6 6 6

















































7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
5
leading to solutions
































































T￿2 ￿ b q
3
T￿1]
For t = 4; we have
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6 6 6 6 6
6
4
[2b + 2d1] b b
b [2b + 2d2] b
b b [2b + 2d3]
3





















6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6






T￿4 ￿ b q1




T￿4 ￿ b q2





T￿4 ￿ b q3





T￿4 ￿ b q1





T￿4 ￿ b q2





T￿4 ￿ b q3





T￿4 ￿ b q1




T￿4 ￿ b q2






T￿4 ￿ b q3




7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7







1 + ￿ + ￿
2
















T￿4 ￿ b q
1







1 + ￿ + ￿
2
















T￿4 ￿ b q
2







1 + ￿ + ￿
2
















T￿4 ￿ b q
3
T￿1 ￿ b q
3
T￿2]
and so on for additional "terms" in the backward recursion. It is easy to see how the system
of equations changes with each step backwards. The central result is of course that the
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expressions for the solved q0s end up as linear functions of each own stock alone for each
step back in the recursion. For arbitrary date T ￿ t; an induction proof would establish the
validity of the "general term", given say M instead of 3 ￿rms.
18The Quadratic Oil Extraction Oligopoly
References
[1] Benchekroun, Hassan and Ngo Van Long [2005] "The Curse of Windfall Gains in a Non-
renewable Resource Oligopoly", typescript.
[2] Eswaran, Mukesh and Tracy Lewis [1985] "Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equi-
librium Concepts", Canadian Journal of Economics, 18, 3, August, pp. 459-73.
[3] Gelfand, I. M. and S.V. Fomin [1963] Calculus of Variations, Englewood Cli⁄s, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
[4] Levhari, David, and Leonard J. Mirman [1980] "The Great Fish War: An Example Using
a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution", Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring,
pp. 322-34
[5] Lozada, Gabriel A. [1993] "Existence and Characterization of Discrete-time Equilibria in
Extractive Industries" Resource and Energy Economics, 15, pp. 249-54.
19